- S. M. Guriev
Research in Progress: (a revised version of New Economic School Working Paper 99/007). , 09.2000 , p. 1-35, language: английский
Аннотация
- We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. We assume that red tape is informative: it produces certain information about the agent even though imposing a cost upon her. Therefore the socially optimal level of red tape is not trivial. Implementing the social optimum may be difficult if the bureacrat who operates red tape is corrupt. The bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent both ex ante (before setting the level of red tape) and ex post (after learning the information produced through red tape). We show that if there is no threat of ex post corruption, the principal can implement the socially optimal level of red tape even if ex ante corruption is present. The threat of ex post corruption may, however, lead to overproduction of red tape, even though the ex post corruption does not occur in equilibrium.
Ключевые слова
- emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption, principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy, socially optimal level of red tape, ex post corruption
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