S. M. Guriev ,   D.  Kvassov ,   D.  Kvassov CEPR Discussion Paper 2449, RECEP Working Paper 1999/3 New Economic School Working Paper 2000/016. , 03.1999 , p. 1-38, language: английский  Аннотация Unprecendented growth of barter is a striking phenomenon of Russia's transition. The explanations of barter include tight monetary policy, tax evasion and poor financial intermediation. We show that the market power may also be important. We build a model of imperfect competition in which firms use barter for price discrimination. The model predicts a positive relationship between concentration of market power and share of barter in sales. We also show that barter disappears at a certain level of competition. The model has multiple stable equilibria which may explain persistence of barter. Using a unique dataset on barter transactions in Russia, we show that empirical evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.  Ключевые слова barter, Russia's transition, monetary policy, tax evasion, poor financial intermediation, model of imperfect competition, price discrimination, multiple stable equilibria, unique dataset on barter transactions in Russia   Полный текст     в формате pdf